n
his History of France, so characteristic
of the nineteenth century, Jules Michelet has painted
a fresco in which he shows the Church of the thirteenth
century in Languedoc checking "the spirit of
free thought" that represented heresy. The sentences
pour out, nervous, breathless, romantic . . . and
inexact. "This Dominic", he writes, "this
terrifying founder of the Inquisition, was a Castilian
noble. No one surpassed him in the gift of tears,
a thing so often joined to fanaticism." (1)
And in the following chapter he continues: "The
Pope could only vanquish independent mysticism by
himself opening great schools of mysticism: I refer
to the mendicant orders. This was fighting evil with
evil; attempting that most difficult of contradictions,
the regulation of inspiration, the determination of
illuminism . . . delirium unleashed!"
Pedro
Berruguete's (d. 1504) tableau, the Scene of Auto
da fé in the Prado museum in Madrid, is
equally well known. St. Dominic, recognizable by his
mantle ornamented with stars, is seated on a throne
presiding over a tribunal and surrounded by six magistrates,
almost all of them laymen. Below, to the right, are
heretics roped to stakes soon to be set ablaze. The
contrast is striking and the composition noteworthy.
The tableau was doubtless intended for the glory of
Dominic: the same painter designed several altar pieces
for the Dominican convent in Avila at the request
of Thomas of Torquemada (d. I493), Inquisitor General
in Spain in 1483.
If
we go back a little further in history we shall find
Dominican witnesses to show how Dominic took part
in the first Inquisition against the Catharists and
Vaudois in Languedoc. A reference made by Bernard
Gui (I26I I33I) in a Life of St. Dominic
does not hesitate to claim for his Founder the title
of First Inquisitor, following the "legendary"
texts of the thirteenth century. (2)
Nor has the author of the celebrated "Manual
for Inquisitors" hesitated to interpolate on
his own authority the Albigensian History
of Pierre des Vaux de Cernai in order to prove Dominic's
presence at the Battle of Muret during the bloody
Albigensian Crusade on September 12, 1213: the Saint
is pictured holding in his hands a crucifix riddled
with wounds, which is still shown at St. Sernin in
Toulouse. (3)
Lacordaire,
on the contrary, at the moment when he was pleading
before his "country" the cause of the reestablishment
of the Order of Preachers in France in 1838, that
is to say, a few years after the impassioned words
of Michelet about the foundation of the mendicant
orders, affirmed boldly (chap. 6) that "St. Dominic
was not the inventor of the Inquisition, and never
performed the duties of an inquisitor. The Dominicans
were never the promoters or principal agents of the
Inquisition." The historical demonstration following
these claims must unfortunately be viewed with some
reserve. It was - and not only on the basis of historical
accuracy - vehemently attacked, in particular by his
friend Dom Prosper Guéranger, the restorer
of the Benedictines of Solesmes; he accused Lacordaire
of not having the courage to "accept his heritage".
What,
then, are we to believe? Was Dominic the first of
the inquisitors? The answer is categorically: by no
means! Simple chronology suffices to resolve the problem:
Dominic died in 1221, and the office of Inquisitor
was not established until 1231 in Lombardy and 1234
in Languedoc.
Were
the Friars the principal agents of the Inquisition?
Or did they simply take part in it "like everyone
else", as Lacordaire says? This time the answer
must be more nuanced. But we must know exactly what
we are referring to when we use the word inquisition,
so deadly in its ordinary connotation, before we can
attempt to define its significance.
We
must first realize that there were two inquisitions
or, to put it better, two currents of inquisition,
quite dissimilar in their origins and functions. The
first, in the thirteenth century, was the result of
a long process set in motion by the popes; it is often
called "the pontifical inquisition". The
second answered to an initiative of the Catholic kings
of Spain who, in 1478, asked the pope to reorganize
the former institution. This tool of royal absolutism
- aimed at the religious minorities of Jews and Moslems,
who were being assimilated with difficulty into the
national life, and at the current trends of thought
which seemed to be threatening the social order -
would not be suppressed until the nineteenth century.
This was the object of "the black legend",
so tenacious that even today the term "inquisition"
immediately arouses emotional reactions and evokes
concepts of fanaticism and intolerance among the people.
The kings of Spain often appealed to Dominicans like
Thomas of Torquemada, but more often, from the end
of the sixteenth century on, to Jesuits. (4)
When
we speak of the Inquisition today we often confuse
two entities which it would be greatly to our advantage
to distinguish: a procedure and a tribunal. The Inquisitio
is first of all a juridical procedure. It is the procedure
of inquiry which, in modern nations, is officially
opened by public authority when some crime is brought
to its attention. It precedes the registering of a
complaint or accusation, which in its turn will set
in motion the handling of the civil offense. The introduction
of this procedure is very objective and detailed:
this is its guarantee for the accused. The method
has come a long way in comparison with the ancient
procedure of accusation, which was in early times
very general in its character. This was the situation
at the beginning of the thirteenth century in regard
to heretics: they were prosecuted only after having
been formally accused. Toward 1230 the process of
inquiry was used in regard to matters of faith. The
problem lay not in the process of inquiry itself,
but in the fact that the royal and ecclesiastical
authorities considered that a manifestation of dissent
in matters of faith was a crime, subject to official
prosecution.
The
Inquisition was also a tribunal, an emergency tribunal
destined to identify the crime for heresy, using among
other procedures that of inquiry. This was the origin
of the Office of Inquisition, entrusted to various
persons. Without voiding the tribunal of the bishop
which, up to that time, had dealt with matters of
faith, this new tribunal largely substituted for it.
Heretofore,
heresy had been handled as a spiritual matter by the
bishop's tribunal, which was charged with assessing
the belief of the baptized in a given diocese. The
prince, who used secular constraint to obtain the
accusation and punishment of those condemned for heresy,
according to the normal functioning of his penal law,
left to the bishop the final decision as to the validity
of the accusation of heresy.
At
the beginning of the thirteenth century Pope Innocent
III's many moves against heretics, in sending legates
to various parts of Christendom, served only to arouse
and increase the bishops' action. There were vast
campaigns of preaching, destined to bolster the belief
of Catholics and to lead heretics back to the Faith.
It was with one of these campaigns of the Word, being
conducted in the Midi, that Dominic was associated
( 1206-1209).
The
frequent inefficiency of the bishops' tribunals led
Emperor Frederick II of Germany and Pope Gregory IX
to move toward the creation of an emergency tribunal.
Its judge would be a cleric, but the prince would
vouch for its foundation and temporal effectiveness.
He would determine the locales, maintenance, the carrying
out of arrests, and appearances before the courts,
as well as the penalties incurred according to his
own penal laws. In 1231 a joint decision of Pope and
Emperor led to the creation of the Office of the Inquisition,
to be erected from that time on in Germany and Italy.
This tribunal was introduced in northern France in
1233 and in the Midi at the beginning of 1234. It
is clear, therefore, that it was not especially designed
for the latter region as is commonly supposed. It
had nothing to do with St. Dominic.
This
office may be defined as an emergency tribunal set
up on a permanent basis to deal with all matters involving
the defense of the Faith, and using the inquisitorial
procedure, which was far more flexible and effective.
(5) It was not a "religious
policy". It was a matter of convincing a heretic
of the contradictory position he held in regard to
the Christian Faith, and of converting him. The Inquisitor
must therefore be a good preacher. For the least grave
faults the tribunal imposed penalties of a religious
nature: to carry a cross, to visit churches, to make
pilgrimages - or more weighty undertakings. If the
heretic was obdurate, the Church handed him over to
the secular arm which could, from the thirteenth century
on, decree the death penalty, forbidden however at
the Third Lateran Council. From 1252 on, the Inquisition
made use of the right to torture those charged with
heresy, as was customary at the time in common law.
We can see from this the importance of the role of
the Inquisition.
The
choice of the one who should be judge of the Faith
was all the more serious in Pope Gregory IX's opinion,
since he feared the danger of a judge too dependent
on the prince, in whose service he could slight honesty
in the performance of his duties. This was often the
case with bishops, especially in Germany. The Pope
therefore tended to choose religious, and sometimes
secular priests. The first known Inquisitor, Conrad
of Marburg, was a secular priest. Soon, however, the
Pope turned to the Dominicans, particularly for France
(1233) and Languedoc (1234). Two years later he added
a Franciscan. In the ensuing years the Inquisitors
of Languedoc were regularly Dominicans, those of Provence,
Franciscans. These religious could devote themselves
to instructing the people in the Faith with more continuity
and greater depth than could monks or secular clergy,
who were frequently drawn away to other tasks. But
the Inquisition was never, as such, an office of the
Order of Preachers.
The
inquisitors were not responsible for the creation
of the Inquisition. If some of them lost their sense
of proportion due to the fearsome power given them,
like the too celebrated Roger of Bougre, named in
1235, who dishonored his name by his excesses in northern
France, most fulfilled the duties of judge entrusted
to them with competence, freedom of spirit and a concern
for the salvation of souls. They were convinced of
the salutary need for this charge, as were most Christians
in the West.
The
problem of the Inquisition is rooted in two far older
problems: that of the prosecution of heresy in Christian
society and, more generally, that of the feelings
of this society about disagreements within the body
of the faithful.
The
latter goes back to the origins of the Church, when
Christians were intensely attached to "being
of one mind" (Phil 2:2): "one Lord, one
Faith, one baptism, one God and Father of us all"
as St. Paul wrote (Eph 4:5). Faith was indeed entirely
a gift of God; but to be authentic, it required belief
and a common objective content.
It
was Western society, ecclesiastical and political,
which was responsible for creating and perfecting
the Inquisition by a series of decisions on many levels.
Western Christianity, welding the Church and temporal
society together, believed it a just and holy thing
to make Christian Faith and morals the basis for civil
legislation and to place in its service the power
of temporal coercion, of which the Inquisition was
but one tool.
This
sense of responsibility on the part of Europeans for
the rule of Faith and for the salvation of their subjects,
and their desire to intervene for its defense with
the help of their bishops, remained very much alive
in the West until the sixteenth century, even until
the seventeenth. To rebel against the Faith was to
rebel against the prince.
In
their concern about salvation, so preponderant at
the time, nations were often the first to insist on
the prosecution of those who propagated teachings
or methods of obtaining salvation that, in the judgment
of the Church, risked the eternal loss of Christians.
The man of the Middle Ages could understand tolerance
of pagans who had no way of knowing revelation, but
he was rigorous in dealing with Jews. This was to
be the attitude of the papacy. It could regard deviations
from the Catholic Faith and the repudiation of baptism
only as grave sins. (6)
Dissension
regarding the Faith thus appeared as the gravest of
faults, by far the most pernicious. This is why the
inquisitorial process sought first to cure,
as a physician does. Not only the society that was
threatened, but also the heretic himself, must be
saved. This was the famous dilemma posed by Dostoyevsky
in the striking scene of the Grand Inquisitor, depicted
by him as an expression of Ivan Karamazov's revolt.
Throughout
the Middle Ages this sort of temporal and spiritual
collusion culminating in the Inquisition was considered
normal. In none of the quarrels in which kings, emperors
and rebellious clerics opposed the papacy - theologians
like Marsile of Padua for example, so virulent and
violent - do we find taunts about the Inquisition.
Public opinion gave every evidence of approving, even
desiring it. We must await the eve of the ideal of
"tolerance", to find the challenging of
at least the methods, if not the existence, of the
institution. Erasmus, in this area as in others, seems
to have been a precursor.
The
Middle Ages were far more aware of social truths and
values than of the sincerity of personal convictions.
The deepening of the sense of the person and of liberty,
though stressed by St. Paul as he considered Christian
life to be ruled by grace (Gal 5:13) is a comparatively
recent triumph. Our times cannot judge ages which
thought otherwise. Our actual living out of this liberty
is not, despite all the declarations of its intentions,
favorable to the rights of man. 
(Source
: Bedouelle, Guy. Saint Dominique. The Grace of
the Word. Ignatius, 1987.)
