n
his History of France, so characteristic of the
nineteenth century, Jules Michelet has painted a fresco
in which he shows the Church of the thirteenth century
in Languedoc checking "the spirit of free thought"
that represented heresy. The sentences pour out, nervous,
breathless, romantic . . . and inexact. "This Dominic",
he writes, "this terrifying founder of the Inquisition,
was a Castilian noble. No one surpassed him in the gift
of tears, a thing so often joined to fanaticism."
(1) And in the following chapter he continues:
"The Pope could only vanquish independent mysticism
by himself opening great schools of mysticism: I refer
to the mendicant orders. This was fighting evil with evil;
attempting that most difficult of contradictions, the
regulation of inspiration, the determination of illuminism
. . . delirium unleashed!"
Pedro
Berruguete's (d. 1504) tableau, the Scene of Auto
da fé in the Prado museum in Madrid, is equally
well known. St. Dominic, recognizable by his mantle ornamented
with stars, is seated on a throne presiding over a tribunal
and surrounded by six magistrates, almost all of them
laymen. Below, to the right, are heretics roped to stakes
soon to be set ablaze. The contrast is striking and the
composition noteworthy. The tableau was doubtless intended
for the glory of Dominic: the same painter designed several
altar pieces for the Dominican convent in Avila at the
request of Thomas of Torquemada (d. I493), Inquisitor
General in Spain in 1483.
If
we go back a little further in history we shall find Dominican
witnesses to show how Dominic took part in the first Inquisition
against the Catharists and Vaudois in Languedoc. A reference
made by Bernard Gui (I26I I33I) in a Life of St. Dominic
does not hesitate to claim for his Founder the title of
First Inquisitor, following the "legendary"
texts of the thirteenth century. (2)
Nor has the author of the celebrated "Manual for
Inquisitors" hesitated to interpolate on his own
authority the Albigensian History of Pierre des
Vaux de Cernai in order to prove Dominic's presence at
the Battle of Muret during the bloody Albigensian Crusade
on September 12, 1213: the Saint is pictured holding in
his hands a crucifix riddled with wounds, which is still
shown at St. Sernin in Toulouse. (3)
Lacordaire,
on the contrary, at the moment when he was pleading before
his "country" the cause of the reestablishment
of the Order of Preachers in France in 1838, that is to
say, a few years after the impassioned words of Michelet
about the foundation of the mendicant orders, affirmed
boldly (chap. 6) that "St. Dominic was not the inventor
of the Inquisition, and never performed the duties of
an inquisitor. The Dominicans were never the promoters
or principal agents of the Inquisition." The historical
demonstration following these claims must unfortunately
be viewed with some reserve. It was - and not only on
the basis of historical accuracy - vehemently attacked,
in particular by his friend Dom Prosper Guéranger,
the restorer of the Benedictines of Solesmes; he accused
Lacordaire of not having the courage to "accept his
heritage".
What,
then, are we to believe? Was Dominic the first of the
inquisitors? The answer is categorically: by no means!
Simple chronology suffices to resolve the problem: Dominic
died in 1221, and the office of Inquisitor was not established
until 1231 in Lombardy and 1234 in Languedoc.
Were
the Friars the principal agents of the Inquisition? Or
did they simply take part in it "like everyone else",
as Lacordaire says? This time the answer must be more
nuanced. But we must know exactly what we are referring
to when we use the word inquisition, so deadly in its
ordinary connotation, before we can attempt to define
its significance.
We
must first realize that there were two inquisitions or,
to put it better, two currents of inquisition, quite dissimilar
in their origins and functions. The first, in the thirteenth
century, was the result of a long process set in motion
by the popes; it is often called "the pontifical
inquisition". The second answered to an initiative
of the Catholic kings of Spain who, in 1478, asked the
pope to reorganize the former institution. This tool of
royal absolutism - aimed at the religious minorities of
Jews and Moslems, who were being assimilated with difficulty
into the national life, and at the current trends of thought
which seemed to be threatening the social order - would
not be suppressed until the nineteenth century. This was
the object of "the black legend", so tenacious
that even today the term "inquisition" immediately
arouses emotional reactions and evokes concepts of fanaticism
and intolerance among the people. The kings of Spain often
appealed to Dominicans like Thomas of Torquemada, but
more often, from the end of the sixteenth century on,
to Jesuits. (4)
When
we speak of the Inquisition today we often confuse two
entities which it would be greatly to our advantage to
distinguish: a procedure and a tribunal. The Inquisitio
is first of all a juridical procedure. It is the procedure
of inquiry which, in modern nations, is officially opened
by public authority when some crime is brought to its
attention. It precedes the registering of a complaint
or accusation, which in its turn will set in motion the
handling of the civil offense. The introduction of this
procedure is very objective and detailed: this is its
guarantee for the accused. The method has come a long
way in comparison with the ancient procedure of accusation,
which was in early times very general in its character.
This was the situation at the beginning of the thirteenth
century in regard to heretics: they were prosecuted only
after having been formally accused. Toward 1230 the process
of inquiry was used in regard to matters of faith. The
problem lay not in the process of inquiry itself, but
in the fact that the royal and ecclesiastical authorities
considered that a manifestation of dissent in matters
of faith was a crime, subject to official prosecution.
The
Inquisition was also a tribunal, an emergency tribunal
destined to identify the crime for heresy, using among
other procedures that of inquiry. This was the origin
of the Office of Inquisition, entrusted to various persons.
Without voiding the tribunal of the bishop which, up to
that time, had dealt with matters of faith, this new tribunal
largely substituted for it.
Heretofore,
heresy had been handled as a spiritual matter by the bishop's
tribunal, which was charged with assessing the belief
of the baptized in a given diocese. The prince, who used
secular constraint to obtain the accusation and punishment
of those condemned for heresy, according to the normal
functioning of his penal law, left to the bishop the final
decision as to the validity of the accusation of heresy.
At
the beginning of the thirteenth century Pope Innocent
III's many moves against heretics, in sending legates
to various parts of Christendom, served only to arouse
and increase the bishops' action. There were vast campaigns
of preaching, destined to bolster the belief of Catholics
and to lead heretics back to the Faith. It was with one
of these campaigns of the Word, being conducted in the
Midi, that Dominic was associated ( 1206-1209).
The
frequent inefficiency of the bishops' tribunals led Emperor
Frederick II of Germany and Pope Gregory IX to move toward
the creation of an emergency tribunal. Its judge would
be a cleric, but the prince would vouch for its foundation
and temporal effectiveness. He would determine the locales,
maintenance, the carrying out of arrests, and appearances
before the courts, as well as the penalties incurred according
to his own penal laws. In 1231 a joint decision of Pope
and Emperor led to the creation of the Office of the Inquisition,
to be erected from that time on in Germany and Italy.
This tribunal was introduced in northern France in 1233
and in the Midi at the beginning of 1234. It is clear,
therefore, that it was not especially designed for the
latter region as is commonly supposed. It had nothing
to do with St. Dominic.
This
office may be defined as an emergency tribunal set up
on a permanent basis to deal with all matters involving
the defense of the Faith, and using the inquisitorial
procedure, which was far more flexible and effective.
(5) It was not a "religious policy".
It was a matter of convincing a heretic of the contradictory
position he held in regard to the Christian Faith, and
of converting him. The Inquisitor must therefore be a
good preacher. For the least grave faults the tribunal
imposed penalties of a religious nature: to carry a cross,
to visit churches, to make pilgrimages - or more weighty
undertakings. If the heretic was obdurate, the Church
handed him over to the secular arm which could, from the
thirteenth century on, decree the death penalty, forbidden
however at the Third Lateran Council. From 1252 on, the
Inquisition made use of the right to torture those charged
with heresy, as was customary at the time in common law.
We can see from this the importance of the role of the
Inquisition.
The
choice of the one who should be judge of the Faith was
all the more serious in Pope Gregory IX's opinion, since
he feared the danger of a judge too dependent on the prince,
in whose service he could slight honesty in the performance
of his duties. This was often the case with bishops, especially
in Germany. The Pope therefore tended to choose religious,
and sometimes secular priests. The first known Inquisitor,
Conrad of Marburg, was a secular priest. Soon, however,
the Pope turned to the Dominicans, particularly for France
(1233) and Languedoc (1234). Two years later he added
a Franciscan. In the ensuing years the Inquisitors of
Languedoc were regularly Dominicans, those of Provence,
Franciscans. These religious could devote themselves to
instructing the people in the Faith with more continuity
and greater depth than could monks or secular clergy,
who were frequently drawn away to other tasks. But the
Inquisition was never, as such, an office of the Order
of Preachers.
The
inquisitors were not responsible for the creation of the
Inquisition. If some of them lost their sense of proportion
due to the fearsome power given them, like the too celebrated
Roger of Bougre, named in 1235, who dishonored his name
by his excesses in northern France, most fulfilled the
duties of judge entrusted to them with competence, freedom
of spirit and a concern for the salvation of souls. They
were convinced of the salutary need for this charge, as
were most Christians in the West.
The
problem of the Inquisition is rooted in two far older
problems: that of the prosecution of heresy in Christian
society and, more generally, that of the feelings of this
society about disagreements within the body of the faithful.
The
latter goes back to the origins of the Church, when Christians
were intensely attached to "being of one mind"
(Phil 2:2): "one Lord, one Faith, one baptism, one
God and Father of us all" as St. Paul wrote (Eph
4:5). Faith was indeed entirely a gift of God; but to
be authentic, it required belief and a common objective
content.
It
was Western society, ecclesiastical and political, which
was responsible for creating and perfecting the Inquisition
by a series of decisions on many levels. Western Christianity,
welding the Church and temporal society together, believed
it a just and holy thing to make Christian Faith and morals
the basis for civil legislation and to place in its service
the power of temporal coercion, of which the Inquisition
was but one tool.
This
sense of responsibility on the part of Europeans for the
rule of Faith and for the salvation of their subjects,
and their desire to intervene for its defense with the
help of their bishops, remained very much alive in the
West until the sixteenth century, even until the seventeenth.
To rebel against the Faith was to rebel against the prince.
In
their concern about salvation, so preponderant at the
time, nations were often the first to insist on the prosecution
of those who propagated teachings or methods of obtaining
salvation that, in the judgment of the Church, risked
the eternal loss of Christians. The man of the Middle
Ages could understand tolerance of pagans who had no way
of knowing revelation, but he was rigorous in dealing
with Jews. This was to be the attitude of the papacy.
It could regard deviations from the Catholic Faith and
the repudiation of baptism only as grave sins. (6)
Dissension
regarding the Faith thus appeared as the gravest of faults,
by far the most pernicious. This is why the inquisitorial
process sought first to cure, as a physician
does. Not only the society that was threatened, but also
the heretic himself, must be saved. This was the famous
dilemma posed by Dostoyevsky in the striking scene of
the Grand Inquisitor, depicted by him as an expression
of Ivan Karamazov's revolt.
Throughout
the Middle Ages this sort of temporal and spiritual collusion
culminating in the Inquisition was considered normal.
In none of the quarrels in which kings, emperors and rebellious
clerics opposed the papacy - theologians like Marsile
of Padua for example, so virulent and violent - do we
find taunts about the Inquisition. Public opinion gave
every evidence of approving, even desiring it. We must
await the eve of the ideal of "tolerance", to
find the challenging of at least the methods, if not the
existence, of the institution. Erasmus, in this area as
in others, seems to have been a precursor.
The
Middle Ages were far more aware of social truths and values
than of the sincerity of personal convictions. The deepening
of the sense of the person and of liberty, though stressed
by St. Paul as he considered Christian life to be ruled
by grace (Gal 5:13) is a comparatively recent triumph.
Our times cannot judge ages which thought otherwise. Our
actual living out of this liberty is not, despite all
the declarations of its intentions, favorable to the rights
of man. 
(Source
: Bedouelle, Guy. Saint Dominique. The Grace of the
Word. Ignatius, 1987.)
