Notes on Thomas Aquinas ST 1.1-43 by Scott Steinkerchner OP, 18 Oct 02
Of course the greatest theological mind ever to come to bear on the Christian tradition, Aquinas' theology is at once incredibly complex and completely simple. I will stress here the simple part rather than the complicating details, since I think that is what we will be responsible for in the comps. First off, then, many things in Aquinas' theology spring from his world picture, and to see this, much of what he says makes easy sense.
God created the universe with a divine plan. In that plan, humanity was created with intelligence to apprehend the plan and in so doing ultimately apprehend the planner, God, and ultimately becoming united with God. For Aquinas, perhaps the most important quote in scripture is "Here we see darkly, but one day we will see Him as He is". A lot follows from this:
I use here an abbreviated format for denoting references. "1.1.5.r1" is more normally written "ST I, q. 1, a. 5, ad. 1" which means "Summa Theologiae book I, question 1, article 5, response to objection 1." If there is no ".r" section, the quote is from the main section, "I answer that…".
From above we can see that "man is directed to God, as to an end that surpasses the grasp of his reason… But the end must first be known by men who are to direct their thoughts and actions to the end" (1.1.1). Thus we use a twofold path to reach God, "Philosophical Science," the use of human reason applied to our experience of the world, and "Sacred Science," the use of reason in understanding God's revelation (1.1.2). Aquinas' reasoning for the existence and relation of these two paths tells us a lot about his theological method.
Theology and philosophy, even working together, are not the best source of truth. Rather, "it is the virtuous man… who is the measure and rule of human acts." (ST 1.Q1.A6.r3). When we gain wisdom (a gift of the Holy Spirit), we become conformed to reality in such a way that we instinctively choose the best path. This is much more reliable than relying on merely external, discursive reasoning.
We have already seen above that the truths of scripture are apparent and the starting point of theology. But scripture can also operate on different levels. It employs metaphors so that we can apply what we have learned from the world to God, whom we have never seen (1.1.8). Here is an important paragraph from 1.1.9 that we need to unpack:
The author of Holy Writ is God, in whose power it is to signify His meaning, not by words only (as man also can do), but also by things themselves. So, whereas in every other science things are signified by words, this science has the property, that the things signified by the words have themselves also a signification. Therefore that first signification whereby words signify things belongs to the first sense, the historical or literal. That signification whereby things signified by words have themselves also a signification is called the spiritual sense, which is based on the literal, and presupposes it. Now this spiritual sense has a threefold division. For as the Apostle says (Heb. 10:1) the Old Law is a figure of the New Law, and Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) "the New Law itself is a figure of future glory." Again, in the New Law, whatever our Head has done is a type of what we ought to do. Therefore, so far as the things of the Old Law signify the things of the New Law, there is the allegorical sense; so far as the things done in Christ, or so far as the things which signify Christ, are types of what we ought to do, there is the moral sense. But so far as they signify what relates to eternal glory, there is the anagogical sense. Since the literal sense is that which the author intends, and since the author of Holy Writ is God, Who by one act comprehends all things by His intellect, it is not unfitting, as Augustine says (Confess. xii), if, even according to the literal sense, one word in Holy Writ should have several senses.
Only God can communicate in this way since God created all things. Contemporary theologians will use this understanding of the "analogical sense" of scripture to justify why we must only use masculine pronouns for God, that there is a deeper meaning for us in this analogous masculinity of God.
As Fergus Kerr points out in his book After Aquinas, for Aquinas God is more an activity than a being, though 20th century discourse has reversed this entirely. Keep this in mind throughout the discussion and see how he is correct and therefore how most of our assumptions about what Aquinas believes about God need revised.
God is supremely knowable (that is, able to be known) but is not known directly by us (because our way of knowing involves our senses) (1.2.1). Instead we see God's effects, and reason backwards to the cause to know something about God. But creation is accomplished by the divine nature which is shared equally by the three persons, so what we can know about God by observing the world is limited to the divine nature as one (1.32.1). We can know nothing of the triune nature of God in this way.
Proofs for the existence of God: who cares. The "Five Ways" are in 1.2.3 and they are all based on the logic that causes must precede their effects, though not necessarily temporally.
God is the unmoved mover (1.2.3) in whom is no potentiality (1.3.1) nor composition (1.3.2 and 1.3.7 God is "simple") nor accidents (1.3.3, 1.3.6, "accidents" here meaning things that might or might not be true about God, as skin color is accidental to humans or even having this particular body is accidental to my being human). In God essence and existence are identical (1.3.4), thus distinguishing God from all other beings (1.7.1.r3) while being in all beings (1.8); but also all perfections come together and merge such as goodness (1.5-6), wisdom, justice, mercy, etc.
Only God is "eternal." It is interesting to understand what Aquinas means by this, because creation could have no beginning or end, yet it is still not eternal (1.10.4). You should understand the special significance of the parts of this paragraph that are in bold:
As we attain to the knowledge of simple things by way of compound things, so must we reach to the knowledge of eternity by means of time, which is nothing but the numbering of movement by "before" and "after." For since succession occurs in every movement, and one part comes after another, the fact that we reckon before and after in movement, makes us apprehend time, which is nothing else but the measure of before and after in movement. Now in a thing bereft of movement, which is always the same, there is no before or after. As therefore the idea of time consists in the numbering of before and after in movement; so likewise in the apprehension of the uniformity of what is outside of movement, consists the idea of eternity. (1.10.1)
God is eternal because God is immutable and is simultaneously whole and present at each moment in time (1.10.2). God alone is apart from time (1.10.3). This does not just mean that God has no beginning nor end (creation might be like that), but that God does not have any basis for change (1.10.4). God can therefore see the future and everything that might be but is not, since all of time is present to God as one and God can see all possibilities of all things since God sees their essence (1.14.9). (my note: There is no "before" or "after" with God. Keeping this in mind gets one out of all of the stickiness of issues such as predestination).
Background: Aquinas' Trinitarian theology is really simple when seen in the right light. First, remember that theology argues from things given in revelation to other truths and to fuller truths, and that God can use things themselves as metaphorical communication into the divine essence Thus, the fact that God is Father, Son and Spirit is a given for Aquinas, and that the Son is "begotten" or "generated" by the Father and the Spirit "proceeds" from the Father and Son by "spiration" is highly probable (having been established by Councils and the Fathers). Aquinas therefore takes these truths and explains why they are not contrary to reason, he does not reason to their veracity.
Approach: Aquinas makes use of two important concepts, "subsistent relations" and Augustine's "psychological analogy." But remember that by applying the psychological analogy he is not proving what God is like by looking at the world. Rather, the Trinitarian God revealed Godself as Trinitarian in scripture and left a metaphor of that relationship written into human beings for us to read and then pointed out the metaphor itself in scripture. Thus human intellect and will are an analogous illustration of the Divine reality, not a proof of them.
Subsistent Relations: A relation is something in one that refers to another (1.28.1). Sometimes these are in relations are logical (in the mind only) and sometimes they are intrinsic to the nature of the things related. An example of a logical relationship he gives is is that man is related to animal as species to genus. We could also add that human love gives us a logical relationship to the beloved. He uses the "natural place" of a heavy object being the center as an example of a real relationship since it is inherent to the nature of the heavy object and will later add creation's dependence on God for existence as another example.
Psychological Analogy: 1) Intellect/Son. Using this concept of relation, Aquinas uses the psychological analogy to explain that in God there are two real relations, one of intellect and one of will. Only these relations internal to God are real relations to God, and these relations establish the divine persons (1.28.4). The relation of intellect is God thinking the Word. Thought and thinker are two logically opposed realities, so the two sides of this relation must be different, but because of God's perfection and simplicity, God completely understand's Godself, and so the thought contains everything of the thinker. ( "the intellect is made actual by the object understood residing according to its own likeness in the intellect" 1.27.4). Thus, this relation is subsistent, residing in the very nature of God, and so is intrinsic and eternal (unchanging, not everlasting as was explained above). In God there cannot be the intellect without the object understood, they are mutually arising and both intrinsic. From scripture we know that the Father is the thinker and the Word is the Son, and we cannot have the Father without the Son. We call the Son "begotten" or "generated" of the Father because the Son is a likeness of the Father as a son is likeness of a father (remember that in his science the father provides the only seed, so a mother/daughter analogy would say something quite different and indeed be heretical).
2) Will/Spirit. The relation of will is loving, "the will is made actual, not by any similitude of the object willed within it, but by its having a certain inclination to the thing willed" (1.27.4). Again by the nature of the relation the two terms are logically opposed realities and mutually arising, yielding another subsistent relation that gives rise to its two terms, but Aquinas makes an interesting move here. If we assume that one term is the Father, then there is no reason why the other term could not be the Son, because the relation of loving is not opposed to the relation of knowing. If this were so, however, we would only have two persons in God, which is not true. So we must conclude that one term is neither the Father nor the Son, but the two together who together therefore love a third person, the Holy Spirit (1.36.2 and 1.36.4.r1). Thus we say that the Spirit "proceeds" from the Father and the Son. We use the word "proceeds" because we have no analogy to provide us with a better word, and we say that the Spirit proceeds by way of "spiration" though this word is simply a designator since we really have no analogy on which to base a better understanding. ("Generation" was used for the relation that establishes the Son because knowing requires a likeness in the thing known. There is no such requirement in the relation of loving which establishes the Spirit.)
More Vocabulary: Aquinas uses the word "person" because it is a given, but also explains that: "a divine person signifies a relation as subsisting. And this is to signify relation by way of substance, and such a relation is a hypostasis subsisting in the divine nature, although in truth that which subsists in the divine nature is the divine nature itself. Thus it is true to say that the name "person" signifies relation directly, and the essence indirectly; not, however, the relation as such, but as expressed by way of a hypostasis. So likewise it signifies directly the essence, and indirectly the relation, inasmuch as the essence is the same as the hypostasis: while in God the hypostasis is expressed as distinct by the relation: and thus relation, as such, enters into the notion of the person indirectly." (1.29.4). He acknowledges that "substance" (or "first substance" is probably a more direct translation of "hypostasis" but uses "subsistence" instead because in the West "substance" has become an ambiguous term signifying both a thing and its essence (1.29.2).
God is our highest good.We are body/soul composits whose nature is to understand reality through our senses. Since God is ultimate reality, our telos is the beatific vision, seeing God as God is. Of course we can't do that in this world, since here we see light and hear sounds, but we can come to know something about God here through God's causality of things here.
How we know: "Two things are required both for sensible and for intellectual vision---viz. power of sight, and union of the thing seen with the sight. For vision is made actual only when the thing seen is in a certain way in the seer. Now in corporeal things it is clear that the thing seen cannot be by its essence in the seer, but only by its likeness; as the similitude of a stone is in the eye, whereby the vision is made actual; whereas the substance of the stone is not there." (1.12.2, cf. 1.12.13). revelation helps in both these areas. It can strengthen our ability to reason and even give us "visions" to think about (1.12.13).
How God is known by us: In this, we have a summation of a lot of Thomas' ideas: "Since everything is knowable according as it is actual, God, Who is pure act without any admixture of potentiality, is in Himself supremely knowable. But what is supremely knowable in itself, may not be knowable to a particular intellect, on account of the excess of the intelligible object above the intellect; as, for example, the sun, which is supremely visible, cannot be seen by the bat by reason of its excess of light. Therefore some who considered this, held that no created intellect can see the essence of God. This opinion, however, is not tenable. For as the ultimate beatitude of man consists in the use of his highest function, which is the operation of his intellect; if we suppose that the created intellect could never see God, it would either never attain to beatitude, or its beatitude would consist in something else beside God; which is opposed to faith. For the ultimate perfection of the rational creature is to be found in that which is the principle of its being; since a thing is perfect so far as it attains to its principle. Further the same opinion is also against reason. For there resides in every man a natural desire to know the cause of any effect which he sees; and thence arises wonder in men. But if the intellect of the rational creature could not reach so far as to the first cause of things, the natural desire would remain void." (1.12.1). However, we can only have this beatific vision after this life (1.12.11) and with the aid of grace (cf. 1.23.1) since it is beyond our nature. (Interesting to note that we cannot attain our natural end without supernatural help).
Theodicy: Aquinas often quotes this position from Augustine: "As Augustine says (Enchiridion xi): "Since God is the highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works, unless His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil." This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that He should allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good." (1.2.3.r1). Aquinas also holds that in the beatific vision we will see the divine essence itself as we are able, but that is all that we will see. We will not see others or the future or possibilities. He says that this is a good thing because that's all we naturally desire anyway (1.12.9.r4). Think how opposite is Dostoyevsky's Grand Inquisitor. I find his whole approach to theodicy quite lacking.
Providence: I include this just because it is a large section of our reading. It seems off topic to me, but was obviously important in Aquinas' day and gives an insight into how he understands the world. It is crucial to remember that Aquinas often argues from collaborative causality, that things done by humans are also done by God, one not excluding the other. The explanation of this is outside our reading, (ST 1.105.5) but is important for this discussion. God does what God does through the causality of created things, so both God and the physical thing are true causes, just as the axe and the woodsman are both true causes of the cutting down of a tree. Now, some things have more goodness in them than others. This must be in accord with God's will, and so we say that God loves some things more than others (1.20.4). The end of all things pre-exists in God's mind, and this we call providence (1.22.1). Providence covers both the end of all things and the execution of this order (government of creation) (1.22.3). In the former, God's providence is immediate. Of the latter, it happens through intermediary causes. Since some of the ends known by God are who is saved and who is not, Aquinas holds for predestination (1.23.1). But as can be seen from his argumentation, predestination does not exclude free will nor human causality in God's reprobation: "Reprobation differs in its causality from predestination. This latter is the cause both of what is expected in the future life by the predestined---namely, glory---and of what is received in this life---namely, grace. Reprobation, however, is not the cause of what is in the present---namely, sin; but it is the cause of abandonment by God. It is the cause, however, of what is assigned in the future---namely, eternal punishment. But guilt proceeds from the free-will of the person who is reprobated and deserted by grace. In this way, the word of the prophet is true---namely, "Destruction is thy own, O Israel." (1.23.3.r2). Also, we can see that prayers cannot affect God's providence, but they can be actively involved in the salvation of others (1.23.8).